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I.
"Drainage! .

.

[Vol. 118

INTRODUCTION

. Here, if you have a milkshake, and I have a milkshake,

and I have a straw .... Now, my straw reaches across the room and starts to
drink your milkshake. I drink your milkshake!"' This climactic quote occurs
near the end of the 2007 film There Will Be Blood, when Daniel Plainview, an
oil baron, explains to Eli Sunday, a longtime holdout on leasing his mineral
interests, why Sunday's property is now worthless. 2 Because of his
stubbornness and desire for control, Eli had long refused to lease his church's
valuable mineral rights to Daniel.3 Eli, however, had fallen on hard times, and
after many years, he comes to beg Daniel to lease the property from him. 4 Eli is
despondent at the news that his minerals are long gone because Daniel had
drilled all the land surrounding Eli's.5 Despite the fact that Eli had decided not
to lease his property, Daniel had recovered and profited from all Eli's oil and
gas anyway! 6 Even though Eli is set up as a manipulative villain in this
particular movie, the above scene is a perfect and hyperbolic example of the
effects of the "rule of capture," which is the basis for much of oil and gas
common law.7 Because oil and gas gather underground in pools and deposits
that often defy the boundaries of surface ownership, courts have long held that
landowners may permissibly drain resources from neighboring properties. In
other words, a landowner acquires title to any oil and gas that he produces from
wells drilled on his own property, even if the minerals migrated from adjacent
tracts that lie over the same pool of minerals. 9
Recently, technological developments such as directional drilling have
provided the ability to economically produce natural gas from shale formations
that have long been considered unfeasible for production.'o This boom in
production includes the Marcellus Shale underlying much of the Appalachian

I
THERE WILL BE BLOOD (Paramount Vantage 2007). For another piece that begins with this
example, see Levi Rodgers, Subsurface Trespass by Hydraulic Fracturing:Escaping Coastal v.
Garza's DisparateJurisprudenceThrough Equitable Compromise, 45 Tex. Tech L. Rev. Online
Edition 99, 100 (2013).
2

THERE WILL BE BLOOD, supra note 1.

Id
4

Id.

6

Id
Id
Id; see infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.

9
10

Id
MICHAEL RATNER & MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43148, AN OVERVIEW OF

UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND NATURAL GAS: RESOURCES AND FEDERAL ACTIONS 1 (Apr. 22, 2015),

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43148.pdf.
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Basin." Because of these developments and increased production in the area,
there has never been a more appropriate time to reexamine certain aspects of
West Virginia's conservation law. Much like the rest of the country, 2 a
majority of the state's oil and gas common law decisions are based on the rule
of capture, an ancient doctrine considering its origins.' 3 Esteemed scholars
believe that the rule is too deeply embedded in American energy law to simply
overturn after more than a century of effect, precedent, and reliance.1 4 Although
it may prove difficult to simply abandon the rule of capture and its progeny, if
West Virginia wishes to continue as a prolific producer of oil and gas from the
Marcellus Shale, it is certainly time to enact laws that limit the rule's effect in
prominent drilling situations.
This Note argues that West Virginia should adopt a statutory pooling or
unitization scheme for shallow oil and gas wells in order to ensure that
correlative rights and conservation goals are satisfied in the continued
development of the Marcellus Shale. Part II.A surveys the history and side
effects of the rule of capture, while Part II.B discusses various common law
and statutory responses meant to limit the rule. The history of the rule of
capture and its limitations in West Virginia are embedded into those sections
respectively. Part III.A and III.B analyze the substantial shortcomings of West
Virginia common law and legislation to deal with the adverse effects of the rule
of capture. They show that a statutory scheme for pooling or unitization of
shallow wells would benefit landowners by giving them bargaining power and
more options when negotiating leases with oil and gas operators. Lastly, Part
III.C suggests how that legislation would benefit private landowners and the
citizens of West Virginia.
II.

BACKGROUND

When the first oil well was drilled in the United States in 1859, it
presented an interesting dilemma for systems of common law that understood
mineral rights through the lens of the ad coelum doctrine. 5 Ad coelum is a
shortening of the Latin maxim "cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad
inferos," which is translated loosely as "whoever owns the soil owns up to the
heavens and down to hell."" Although the maxim is phrased in Latin, the

'

ANTHONY ANDREWS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NATURAL GAS DRILLING IN THE

MARCELLUS SHALE
1 (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.wvsoro.org/resources/marcellus/
CRSMarcellusShale 09_09_09.pdf.
12
See infra Part II.A.
13
See Powers v. Union Drilling, Inc., 461 S.E.2d 844, 849 (W. Va. 1995).
14
Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture-An Oil
& Gas Perspective,
35 ENVTL. L. 899, 951-54 (2005).
'5
See JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW: IN A NUTSHELL 11 (6th ed. 2014).
16
Laurie Ristino, Resource PropertyRights, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 57, 58 (2011).
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concept that ownership extended to the center of the earth did not exist in
Roman law, but rather originated as a "hyperbole" in the Commentaries of
William Blackstone.1 7 Prior to Blackstone's declaration that ownership
extended to the center of the earth, English law seemed to limit subsurface
ownership to that which was necessary for surface ownership, i.e. trees, crops,
and near-surface resources.18 In fact, "et ad infernos" (commonly translated as
"to the center of the earth") seems to have been added to the traditional maxim
governing ownership "to the heavens" by courts that applied Blackstone's
theories of ownership. 19
Due to the fact that early American courts relied extensively on
Blackstone, this theory of ownership was adopted early in American
jurisprudence and remains the accepted theory in current property law,20
although it is subject to "many qualifications when actually applied." 2' The
remainder of Part II will address one of these qualifications called the rule of
capture. Section A will describe the origins and effects of the rule, including its
evolution in West Virginia law. Section B will explore various ways that the
legislature and judiciary have attempted to limit the scope and effect of the rule.
A.

The "Rule of Capture"

Minerals like coal fit neatly into the ad coelum theory of subsurface
ownership because they do not move unless they are mined and removed.22
Unfortunately, oil and gas are fugacious in nature and cannot be easily confined
by artificially drawn boundaries of surface ownership; because oil and gas
respond to pressure changes in their subsurface environment, a well that is

17
John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REv. 979, 982-83
(2008); see also Yahuda Abramovitch, The Maxim "Cujus Est Solum Ejus Usque Ad Coelum" as
Applied in Aviation, 8 McGILL L. J. 247, 248-50 (1962) (summarizing scholarship which traces
the origin of the idea to ancient Jewish law, including contracts for sale which granted "from the
depth of the earth to the height of the sky," and the Roman idea of absolute ownership). But see
Abramovitch, supra, at 253-56 (tracing forms of the maxim back to the 13th century and
pointing to a modified version of the maxim, which dealt with ownership to the heavens,
developed by Lord Coke in the 16th century and adopted by William Blackstone in the 18th).
18
Sprankling, supra note 17, at 982-84.

19

Id. at 988.

See id. at 989-91 (pointing out that the emergence of indefinite subsurface ownership in
America was largely the result of the early courts' blind reliance on Blackstone's commentaries).
John G. Sprankling suggests that this theory is hyperbole because it commonly encompasses far
more subsurface use than is at issue and was dismissed as over-inclusive in regard to airspace
ownership upon the advent of the airplane. Id. at 989, 1000.
21
Id. at 991 n.63 (quoting 2 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 14.04(a) (David A. Thomas
ed., 2d ed. 2000)).
22
Thomas A. Daily & W. Christopher Barrier, Well, Now, Ain't That Just Fugacious!: A
Basic Primeron Arkansas Oil and Gas Law, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 211, 240 (2007).
20
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drilled on a particular piece of property may predictably end up draining
resources from beneath neighboring tracts of land.23 i response to this unique
problem, courts turned to a doctrine called the "rule of capture," which protects
operators from liability when they recover the migrating minerals, which may
have been located underneath a neighboring tract.24
The leading commentator Robert E. Hardwicke summarized the
"fundamental" rule of capture, apart from its "refinements" and "corollaries,"
as follows: "The owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil or gas which he
produces from wells drilled thereon, though it may be proved that part of such
oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands."25 Although other rule of capture
cases preceded it, the most commonly cited origin, or at least the clearest and
earliest explanation, of the rule of capture in oil and gas is Westmoreland
CambriaNatural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 26 which involved a dispute between two
lessees of a tract of land.27 The court's formulation in De Witt was essentially
dicta2 8 that explained the nature of oil and gas ownership in order to determine
whether a particular lease had been forfeited by drilling a well and
subsequently shutting it off.29 However, the formulation elucidated the fact that
gas, a mineral that has "peculiar attributes," is more akin to water and must be
treated differently than other minerals:
Water and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed by
themselves, if the analogy be not too fanciful, as minerals
[ferae naturae]. In common with animals, and unlike other
minerals, they have the power and the tendency to escape
without the volition of the owner. Their "fugitive and
wandering existence within the limits of a particular tract [is]
uncertain," .... They belong to the owner of the land, and are
part of it, so long as they are on or in it, and are subject to his
control; but when they escape, and go into other land, or come
under another's control, the title of the former owner is gone.
Possession of the land, therefore, is not necessarily possession
of the gas. If an adjoining, or even a distant, owner, drills his

Id. at 240-42.
See LOWE, supranote 15, at 13.
25
Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of Captureand Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas,
13 TEx. L. REV. 391, 393 (1935); see also TERENCE DAINTITH, FINDERS KEEPERS?: HOW THE LAW
23
24

OF CAPTURE SHAPED THE WORLD OIL INDUSTRY 7 (2010) ("This rule has been perceived as

essentially, one might say quintessentially, American: a rule that places a high value on vigor, on
getting there first, on winning one's wealth through free competition.").
26
18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889).
27
Id. at 724.
28
Kramer & Anderson, supra note 14, at 906.
29
De Witt, 18 A. at 724-25.
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own land, and taps your gas, so that it comes into his well and
under his control, it is no longer yours, but his.30
These remarks by the court referring to oil and gas as ferae naturae3 1
reflect the theory that though one might have the right to drill for oil and gas
under his property, it is not his until he actually does drill and subject it to
ownership. The court based its analysis on the treatment of property with
similar attributes: groundwater and wild animals.32 The following subsections
will survey the theories of property ownership behind the rule of capture, the
undesirable consequences of the rule, and the state of the common law in West
Virginia.
1.

Theories of Ownership

There are two competing theories of oil and gas ownership that provide
the basis for the rule of capture. The first, and perhaps most consistent with the
rule of capture, is the "non-ownership" theory; under this view, landowners
have an interest in the oil and gas underneath their properties, which might be
accurately characterized as "the exclusive right to reduce them to possession."3 3
The non-ownership theory holds that landowners have an "incorporeal right to
use" whereby the actual oil and gas cannot be possessed until produced and
"captured" by someone holding the requisite right to do so. 34 A minority of
states apply this non-ownership theory.3 1

30
Id. at 725. Only a few years after it was decided, De Witt was cited with approval by the
Supreme Court in discussion of a West Virginia case involving ownership of certain leased oil
and gas rights. Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 670 (1895).
3
"Feraenaturae" is defined as "wild; untamed; undomesticated." FeraeNaturae, BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2005).
32
For the most relevant cases establishing the rule of capture in regards to wild animals and
groundwater, see Piersonv. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 175 (N.Y. 1805) ("Pursuit alone gives no right
of property in animalsferce naturce, therefore an action will not lie against a man for killing and
taking one pursued by, and in the view of, the person who originally found, started, chased it, and
was on the point of seizing it. Occupancy in wild animals can be acquired only by
possession .... ), Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1236 (1840) ("[T]he person who owns
the surface may dig therein, and apply all that is there found to his own purposes at his free will
and pleasure; and that if, in the exercise of such right, he intercepts or drains off the water
collected from underground springs in his neighbour's well, this inconvenience to his neighbour
falls within the description of damnum absque injuria, which cannot become the ground of an
action.").
Colleen E. Lamarre, Note, Owning the Center of the Earth: Hydraulic Fracturing and
3
Subsurface Trespass in the Marcellus Shale Region, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457, 469
(2011) (quoting Michelle D. Baldwin, Note, Ownership of Coalbed Methane Gas: Recent
Developments in Case Law, 100 W. VA. L. REv. 673, 676 (1998)).

34
35

Id.
Id
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The majority of states, including West Virginia, adhere to the ad
coelum influenced "ownership-in-place" theory, which says that landowners
have an actual possessory interest in the oil and gas beneath their property in
addition to the right to make use of it.36 In other words, landowners in

'

ownership-in-place states have a corporeal interest in fugacious minerals unless
they migrate from beneath the property.
Practically speaking, the rule of capture functions the same under both
theories. 3 8 "It is inherent in the non-ownership theory" where oil and gas are
only owned once reduced to possession, and it "is a caveat to the ownership-inplace theory" where the ownership is "subject to the right of others to divest"
that ownership by capture. 3 9 The nature of this similarity is illustrated by the
fact that early West Virginia cases focused on the "inherently migratory or
vagrant nature" of oil and gas while the later ones were based "upon the notion
that each has a fixed situs until disturbed or released by the act of man."4 0 This
demonstrates a shift in West Virginia from the "non-ownership" theory to the
"ownership-in-place theory," but with no way to prove that gas recovered from
adjacent property originated beneath their own, current landowners in West
Virginia still cannot recover damages for drained resources. 4
2. Side Effects of the Rule of Capture
Under both theories of ownership, the rule led quickly to
overproduction as landowners drilled wells to try to protect their interest in the
minerals that were underneath their land.42 The necessity of drilling to protect
one's interest has to do with the nature of oil and gas reservoirs.43 As discussed
earlier, an oil and gas reservoir may underlay numerous individually owned
tracts of land, and if only one of those landowners drills a well, under the pure
rule of capture, he owns all of the oil and gas that he recovers from the
communally owned reservoir." Therefore, the only way for each individual
landowner to protect his interest in the reservoir is to drill his own well-this
leads "to excessive well density, substantial over-drilling, and waste, which
36
Id. at 466-68; see syl. pt. 3, Williamson v. Jones, 19 S.E. 436 (W. Va. 1894) ("Petroleum
or mineral oil in place is as much a part of the realty as timber, coal, iron ore, or salt water.").
3
Lamarre, supra note 33, at 467-68.
38

See LOWE, supranote 15, at 34.

3

Id. at 34-35.
Boggess v. Milam, 34 S.E.2d 267, 269 (W. Va. 1945).

40

Id.
Sharon 0. Flanery & Ryan J. Morgan, Overview of Pooling and Unitization Affecting
Appalachian Shale Development, 32 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 457, 460 (2011),
http://www.emlf.org/clientuploads/directory/whitepaper/Flanery.Morganl1 .pdf.
43
See Daily & Barrier, supra note 22, at 241.
41

42

4

See id.
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include[s] undue surface waste, waste of economic resources, and waste of oil
and gas reserves through premature depletion."4 5 The drilling of superfluous
wells causes damage and inconvenience to surface owners because by
necessary implication, they are subject to use of their property for the
extraction of minerals.46
3.

The Rule of Capture in West Virginia

"The rule of capture has a long-standing history in West Virginia."4
The earliest state case thought to deal with the issue is the 1886 case of Wood
County Petroleum Co. v. West Virginia TransportationCo.,48 which involved a
couple in Ritchie County who leased a portion of their land "for the purpose of
mining and excavating for rock and carbon oil" and "for [that] purpose only." 49
The lessors alleged that the lessees had drilled a well to recover natural gas and
had been using the gas, in an amount valued at five dollars per day, to power

45
Flanery & Morgan, supra note 42, at 460. The detrimental economic effect is best
illustrated by the following:

If it costs $700,000 to drill, complete, and equip a well that is capable of
producing one-half (1/2) million MCF of gas from under ten separately
owned, contiguous tracts, and if the price of gas is five dollars per MCF, that
well will yield a gross income of $2,500,000, or a profit of $1,800,000.
However, if each tract owner protects himself by drilling his own $700,000
well, the owners will collectively lose $4,500,000.
Daily & Barrier, supra note 22, at 241-42. The industry and legislative responses to this problem
will be discussed later in Part II.C.
46
See Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725 (W. Va. 1980). For
a good
summary of West Virginia surface use precedent, see Whiteman v. ChesapeakeAppalachia, LLC,
729 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 2013). In Whiteman, the oil and gas operator disposed of drill cuttings in
pits on the plaintiffs land in accordance with its plans for permitting and the notice given to the
plaintiff. Id. at 383-84. The plaintiff argued that this use of the surface was not reasonably
necessary because alternatives existed and were in use elsewhere in the industry, including by the
defendant in other parts of the country. Id. at 392-93. The court determined that the question of
"what is necessary is a fluid concept that must be determined on a case by case basis." Id. at 388.
In addition, the case-by-case determinations of an oil and gas operator will be given weight in
this analysis, and both nationwide and local industry practice are relevant. See id. at 392-93.
Subjective fears alone do not constitute a substantial burden on the surface owner if there is no
stronger evidence of burdens such as reduction in property value or high probability of future
injury. Id. at 392. Most importantly, the court reasoned that "reasonable necessity" is not
synonymous with "necessity"; therefore, the open pit method employed by the defendant was
reasonably necessary because it was the "common and ordinary method of disposal" and
"consistent with permitting requirements." Id. at 392-93. The court held that the defendant had
not committed a trespass because its disposal of the drill cuttings was reasonably necessary and
did not impose a substantial burden. Id. at 394.
47
Powers v. Union Drilling, Inc., 461 S.E.2d 844, 849 (W. Va. 1995).
48
28 W. Va. 210 (1886).
49
Id. at 211.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol118/iss1/17

8

McDaniel: Statutory Pooling and Unitization in West Virginia: The Case for

2015]

STATUTORYPOOLING AND UNITIZATION IN WEST VIRGINIA

447

the machinery they were using to produce oil.50 The lessors sought the value of
that gas because the lessees had refused to pay them for it." The lessees
contended that the gas was produced from their oil well and that it was, and
always had been, an incident to the production of oil that they could not have
hoped to avoid. 52 The court noted that the grant of a lease for mineral
develo ment includes the incident use of elements such as light, air, and
water.
Therefore, the determinative question in Wood County Petroleum Co.
was whether or not natural gas is capable of absolute ownership.54 By
examining the history of gas production and the current knowledge of gas
reservoirs, the court found "that it partakes more nearly of the character of the
elements, air and water, than it does of those things which are the subject of
absolute property."55 Admitting that there was relative scientific uncertainty as
to the exhaustibility of natural gas resources, the court concluded that the lessee
"could not certainly be guilty of either legal or equitable waste in the use of
said gas."5 6 The court concluded that as long as the lessee only produced the
gas incident to its production of oil, the lessor could not recover the value of the
gas without a provision for such compensation in the lease. 7 Just like water
and air, the court considered the lessee's use of the gas to be damnum absque
. .. 58
injuria.
Although Wood County Petroleum Co. was decided almost 60 years
earlier, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has cited the 1945 case
Boggess v. Milam59 as the origin of the rule in West Virginia.60 Boggess
involved a plaintiff who owned a one-tenth interest in the minerals underlying a

50

Id. at 212.

51

Id. at 212-13.

52

Id. at 213-14.

s3

Id. at 215.
Id. at 215-16.

54

Id. at 216-17 (discussing the longevity and production of known gas sources).
Id. at 218.
57
Id. at 219.
58
Id. at 220. Damnum absque injuria translates as "damage without wrongful act" and is
defined as "[l]oss or harm that is incurred from something other than a wrongful act and
occasions no legal remedy." Damnum Absque Injuria, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2005).
5
Boggess v. Milam, 34 S.E.2d 267 (W. Va. 1945).
60
Powers v. Union Drilling, Inc., 461 S.E.2d 844, 849 (W. Va. 1995). Although earlier cases
discussed the matter, Boggess involved a clear discussion of state cases based on both "nonownership" and "ownership-in-place" theories, elucidating a clear statement of the state's view
on mineral interest ownership and the rule of capture. See Boggess, 34 S.E.2d at 267; see also
Gain v. S. Penn Oil Co., 86 S.E. 883 (W. Va. 1915) (involving a similar fact pattern which the
court in Boggess discussed extensively).
5
56
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certain 116-acre tract.6 1 He was given the opportunity to lease his interest but
did not consent to the development of the property. 62 The lessee held a majority
interest in the 116-acre tract and chose to unitize that interest with a
neighboring 53-acre tract on which it drilled a well.63 Although he owned no
interest in the 53-acre tract, the plaintiff contended that the two tracts were
merged because of the unitization and that he was owed a share of the oil and
gas being recovered from beneath the 116-acre tract.65 The court reasoned,
however, that there was merely a merger of contractual obligations, not a
merger of actual title in the two tracts.66
After summarizing the state precedent on the nature of mineral interest
ownership as discussed above, the court issued the following syllabus point,
which "announced . .. the common law rule of capture 68 :
The owner of a minority interest in the oil and gas underlying a
tract of land, the other interests in which are under lease, who
refuses to execute the lease binding his cotenants and a
unitization agreement embracing the tract mentioned and an
adjoining boundary in which he has no interest and which is
under lease to the same lessee, neither the lease nor the
unitization agreement being under attack, has no equitable
interest in the production of a well drilled by the lessee upon
the adjoining boundary.69
Although this holding and syllabus point are very fact specific, they are
supported by the underlying reasoning of the court that mineral interest owners
have no interest in oil or gas recovered from wells on adjacent properties in
which they own no interest. 70
The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed this ruling in the 1995 case
Powers v. Union Drilling, Inc.,7 which ruled against a plaintiff who claimed
the defendant had committed trespass because of drainage from the plaintiffs
property.72 By rejecting the claim that certain voluntary pooling and unitization
61
62

63
6
65
66

67

69

Boggess, 34 S.E.2d at 267.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 267.
For a general discussion of unitization, see infra Part II.B.2.ii.b.
Boggess, 34 S.E.2d at 267.
Id. at 270.
See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
Powers v. Union Drilling, Inc., 461 S.E.2d 844, 849 (W. Va. 1995).
Boggess, 34 S.E.2d at syl. pt. 1.

70

See id.

71

461 S.E.2d 844 (W. Va. 1995).

72

Id. at 847.
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statutes had made the common law rule of capture "highly suspect," the court
reinforced the common law rule of capture announced in Boggess, making it
clear that the pure rule of capture is still in force in West Virginia.
B. Limitations to the Rule of Capture
Over time, both courts and congresses have sought to limit the
undesirable effects of the pure rule of capture. 74 Because of advances in
scientific technology and the accuracy of geologists, oil and gas reservoirs,
along with their quantity and productivity, are far less mysterious than they
used to be.7 Comparisons with wild animals, air, and water are no longer
prevalent.7 6 The introduction of delay rental clauses in oil and gas leases in the
latter part of the 19th century is credited with "ma[king] possible a systematic
approach to petroleum exploration."7 7 In addition, certain wasteful practices
such as excessive flaring caught the attention of state governments.7 8
However, courts have continued to rely on the rule of capture as a basis
for property concerns in oil and gas recovery because by the time a correct
understanding of "reservoir geology. . . and areal drainage" might have
allowed for litigation that prevented drainage, overturning the rule would have
led to unpredictable problems in the industry. 79 Despite a reluctance to discard
the rule of capture, both courts and legislatures have employed a number of
responses to deal with the problems that it presents.80 As explained below, the
correlative rights doctrine and conservation law both attempt to ensure that
owners receive their "fair share" of the minerals under their property.s"
1.

Correlative Rights

As early as 1935, Robert Hardwicke noted that the rule of capture was
viewed as responsible for "most of the evils thought to exist in the oil business"
and that people assumed that "it authorize[d] the taking of another's

Id. at 849. Powers involved a discussion of the voluntary nature and purpose behind West
7
Virginia's provisions for the pooling and unitization of deep wells. Id.
74
LOWE, supra note 15, at 22.
75

Id.

76

M. K. Woodward, Ownership of Interests in Oil and Gas, 26 OHIO ST. L.J. 353, 355

(1965).
7
78
7

DAINTITH, supra note 25, at 175.
Id. at 177. For a more in-depth summary of these developments, see id. at ch. 7.
Terence Daintith, The Rule of Capture: The Least Worst PropertyRulefor Oil and Gas, in

PROPERTY AND THE LAW IN ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 140, 150 (Aileen McHarg et al.

eds., 2010).
80

LOWE, supra note 15, at 22.

81

Id.
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property." 82 One limitation on the rule of capture is the correlative rights
doctrine. Correlative rights have long limited the application of the rule of
capture in order to ensure maximum recovery and give reservoir co-owners
their fair share.84 The doctrine of correlative rights contends that when someone
has the right to produce oil and gas from their property, they should "have a fair
and reasonable opportunity" to produce their "fair share" without interference
from "the negligent or intentional actions of another party" or unjust
deprivation by the state.8 s If the rule of capture is viewed as a rule of nonliability meant to encourage exploration and production of natural resources,
the idea of correlative rights is a logical outgrowth of the rule because waste
and negligence are inconsistent with an interest in efficient resource
production.
The idea of correlative rights stands in stark contrast to the pure rule of
capture. The earliest decisions regarding correlative rights were decided in
Indiana around the turn of the 20th century; at first, they involved due process
challenges to conservation statutes that prohibited waste that would be injurious
to others or the public at large, such as the waste of gas from a reservoir owned
by multiple people. However, the focus of the Indiana Supreme Court later
shifted more toward a common law limitation to the rule. In Manufacturers'
Gas & Oil Co. v. IndianaNatural Gas & Oil Co.,89 the court faced the question
of whether one operator could pump oil and gas from a common supply,
possibly recovering more than other operators. 90 Rather than comparing oil and
gas to wild animals or groundwater, the court compared it to surface water,
limiting an operator's right to recovering only the natural flow of gas by
reasonable means that do not injure or destroy a "common source of supply." 9
Around the same time, the Kentucky Court of Appeals limited the pure rule of

Hardwicke, supra note 25, at 391-92. This notion was backed up by geologists such as
Henry L. Doherty, who was in favor of a federal compulsory unitization statute to prevent the
drilling of unnecessary wells. See Kramer & Anderson, supra note 14, at 900-01.
82

83

LOWE, supra note 15, at 18.

84
David E. Pierce, Minimizing the Environmental Impact of Oil and Gas Development by
Maximizing Production Conservation,85 N.D. L. REv. 759,772 (2009).
85
Brigid R. Landy & Michael B. Reese, Note, Getting to "Yes": A Proposalfor a Statutory

Approach to Compulsory Poolingin Pennsylvania, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYsis 11044,
11049 (2011).
86

See LOWE, supra note 15, at 18-19.

87

See Kramer & Anderson, supra note 14, at 911-13.
Id. at 915.
57 N.E. 912 (Ind. 1900).
Kramer & Anderson, supra note 14, at 915-16.

88

89
90

91

Id. at 916.
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capture by requiring "due regard" for other owners in a common supply and
condemning intentional waste and injury to other producers.92
While the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has not placed
such a firm correlative rights limit as some states have on the rule of capture,
there are several cases and doctrines that reflect a desire to limit the negative
effects of the rule.93 For instance, in Atkinson v. Virginia Oil & Gas Co.,94 the
plaintiff claimed injury when the defendant sunk a well a mere 100 feet from
his own well on adjacent property.95 The alleged injury arose when the
defendant abandoned the well without plugging it, allowing water to seep into
the common formation and obstruct production from the plaintiffs well.
Reasoning that a landowner is "bound to use his property in such manner as not
to injure the property of the adjacent owner, provided he could avoid such
injury by the exercise of care and abstention from negligence," the court
considered that the pollution of an oil and gas well was similar to the pollution
of a water well and provided a cause of action. 97 In addition to the statutory
penalty for failing to plug an abandoned well, 98 the court concluded that the
defendant could be held liable for negligent injury to another's interest in oil
and gas:
Though a gas well is not so essential to the enjoyment of
premises as a water well, it is nevertheless valuable, and
necessary, in the legal sense of the term, to the full enjoyment
of the premises. Hence wanton or negligent injury to it ought,
upon principle, to call for redress in the courts as in the case of
such injury to wells supplying water for domestic purposes.
The duties which are implied in oil and gas leases also serve as an
attempt to protect lessors from the rule of capture by requiring that lessees
develop and drill in such a manner so as to provide mutual benefit to the lessee
and lessor and protect their leasehold from the drainage of adjacent

92
Id. at 918. While Indiana declined to allow producers to use artificial means such as
pumping or compressors, the courts in both Kentucky and Pennsylvania did not prohibit any
production technique as unlawful for a common supply. Id. at 919.
See Atkinson v. Va. Oil & Gas Co., 79 S.E. 647 (W. Va. 1913); see also Adkins v.
9
Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 168 S.E. 366 (W. Va. 1932). See generally Part III.C (describing the
current state of conservation law in West Virginia).
94
79 S.E. 647 (W. Va. 1913).

95
96
97
98
99

Id. at 647-48.
Id. at 648.
Id.
Id. at 648-49.
Id. at 648.
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operations. 00 In Adkins v. Huntington Development & Gas Co.,'or the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia demonstrated its application of these
principles by forcing an operator to drill an offset well. 102 The plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant operators had failed to drill a sufficient number of wells on
their land despite the fact that the operators knew that oil and gas were being
drained by wells and pumps also owned by the operator on adjacent lands.os
Considering all the evidence, the court concluded that even in the absence of
proof that an operator of ordinary prudence would drill an additional well on
the plaintiffs property,1 04 a court could require the drilling of an offset well to
protect against drainage where the operator was fraudulently draining the
plaintiff s land from adjacent tracts. 05
2.

The Legislative Response and Conservation Laws

When confronted with cases involving the rule of capture, some courts
applied the correlative rights doctrine discussed above, and others a ealed to
the legislature to repeal the rule or limit it in an appropriate fashion. In order
to keep oil and gas from being wasted by the drilling of too many wells,
resulting in premature reservoir depletion, legislatures across the country have

too
Jennings v. S. Carbon Co., 80 S.E. 368, 369 (W. Va. 1913) ("There is in every lease on
land for the production of oil and gas a condition, implied when not expressed, that, when the
existence of either of these valuable mineral substances in paying quantities becomes apparent
from operations on the premises leased or on adjoining lands, the lessee shall drill such number
of wells as in the exercise of sound judgment he may deem reasonably necessary to secure either
oil or gas, or both, for the mutual advantage of the owner of the land and of himself as operator
under the lease, also for the protection of the lands leased from drainage through wells on
adjoining or contiguous lands."). The defects in this protection will be discussed later in Part III.
101
168 S.E. 366 (W. Va. 1932).
102
Id. at 369.
103
Id. at 367.
10
This is the standard for requiring that an operator fulfill its implied covenant to develop by
drilling an additional well. Id. at 369.
105
Id. The court also decreed that if no offset well was drilled or additional rental payment
made by the operator, then the lease would be cancelled, and the plaintiff would have the
opportunity to pursue an operator who would continue to develop his land. See id. A few years
earlier, in 1913, the court had concluded that fraudulent drainage could result in partial or
complete cancellation of a lease. Jennings, 80 S.E. at 372.
106
For instance, the court in Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714, 720 (Pa. 1893), described the
rights of a landowner under the rule of capture as very much "absolute, until the legislature shall,
in the interest of the public as consumers, restrict and regulate it by statute." Fourteen years later,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed an opinion in which the lower court again criticized
the fact that the only response to the pure rule of capture was to drill a well on one's own
property; it opined that the rule of capture "may not be the best rule; but neither the Legislature
nor our highest court has given us any better." Barnard v. Monongahela Nat. Gas Co., 65 A. 801,
801 (Pa. 1907).
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responded to both the inherent problems of the rule and appeals from courts or
interested parties by regulating the industry in various ways.' 0 7 This regulation
is largely regarded as desirable and serves the purposes of preventing waste and
protecting the rights of different landowners who reside over a certain pool of
minerals. 08 However, the regulations usually take place on a well-by-well
basis, rather than in consideration of a particular reservoir, and have been
criticized as ineffective for the purpose of protecting correlative rights.' 09 The
following subsections will survey the different types of regulation-well
density, spacing, pooling, and unitization-along with West Virginia's current
conservation law.
i.

Well Density and Spacing Requirements

One of the ways in which legislatures have addressed the inherent
wastefulness of the rule of capture is to regulate well spacing and density on a
well-by-well basis."o This can be accomplished through either spacing
requirements or the designation of drilling units on which no more than one
well may be placed."' Well-spacing requirements address the most obvious
problems of overproduction brought about by the rule of capture; they ensure
that wells are spaced far enough from boundary lines and each other to avoid
excessive drainage.1 2 Such laws do no more than control well location and are
generally applicable unless certain exceptions are made. 113 Exceptions include
wells to prevent confiscation of oil and gas from a tract of land that is too small
to meet the requirements of distance from all its boundaries.'14
The alternative method of regulating well density is to appoint a state
agency to designate drilling units and limit density."' This can be achieved
either directly, by choosing well locations, or indirectly, by limiting the
production that is allowed from the unit."1 6 Typically, such units must overlie a

107

See Daily & Barrier, supra note 22, at 242.

108

Id

109
See Owen L. Anderson & Ernest E. Smith, Exploratory Unitization Under the 2004 Model
Oil and Gas Conservation Act: Leveling the Playing Field, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.

277, 283 (2004) (advocating for early unitization during the exploratory phase of drilling).
11
Id at 278-79. In addition, many states regulate production in order to "prevent production
in excess of the scientifically determined maximum-efficient rate that may damage the reservoir
and share it equitably among the common owners." LOWE, supra note 15, at 29.
1
5 EUGENE KUNTZ, KuNTZ OIL AND GAS § 77.1 (1991).
112
See LOWE, supra note 15, at 23.
113 KuNTZ, supra note 111, § 77.2.
114

id

1"

Id. § 77.3.

116

Id
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common source of supply.117 The direct method requires the appropriate state
agency to make determinations about the number and size of spacing unitswith one well per unit, which can be supplemented with "in fill"' 18 wells later
on-that are necessary to "efficiently and effectively" drain a particular
reservoir." 9 Such units can be anywhere from 40 to 640 acres in size, and the
conservation agency usually also has discretion to grant exceptions to the
spacing units based on geologic conditions or pre-existing wells. 12 0 States have
had to adapt these practices to the recent development of horizontal drilling
techniques by adjusting unit size and shape.121
Many view this method of regulation as inadequate to deal with the
correlative rights concerns because it ignores "the true nature of the typical oil
and gas reservoir." 22 By focusing on well spacing and density, legislatures
base their regulation on geologic fictions of homogenous reservoirs, consistent
radial drilling, and fair offset drilling of rectangular units.1 2 3 Those who
disagree with the well-by-well regulation of well spacing and density are
advocates of unitization,124 which will be discussed in the following subsection.
In addition, the next subsection will explain statutory pooling, which is often
implemented to complement existing well density regulation by apportioning
production or forcing interest owners to participate in an operation.

117

id.

An "in fill well" is "drilled into the same reservoir as known producing wells so that oil or
11
natural gas does not have to travel as far through the formation, thereby helping to improve or
accelerate

recovery."

CONOCOPHILLIPS,

GLOSSARY

OF

OIL

AND

GAS

TERMS

7,

http://www.conocophillips.com/investor-relations/company-reports/Documents/PDF/SMID392COP-Glossary-of-Terms-External-FINAL-5202013.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2015).
See Anderson & Smith, supra note 109, at 278-79.
Id at 279-80. This includes exceptions based on protecting correlative rights and
preventing waste that may result from reservoir edges running through a particular unit. LOWE,
119
120

supra note 15, at 27-28.

LOWE, supra note 15, at 24-25.
Anderson & Smith, supra note 109, at 281.
123
Id. ("Well spacing and density rules are grounded on three assumptions that are largely
false: first, that oil and reservoirs are homogeneous; that is, they have the same characteristics
throughout; second, that all wells completed in such a reservoir will drain in a radial pattern; and
third, that, although drilling units are usually square or rectangular, the drainage pattern of one
well will be fairly offset by the drainage pattern of neighboring wells so that each unit well will
recover a fair share of hydrocarbons.").
124
For a more in-depth discussion of the advantages of exploratory unitization and the
disadvantages of well-by-well regulation, see id.
125
KUNTZ, supra note I 11, § 77.4(a).
121

122
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ii. Poolingand Unitization

Pooling and unitization are separate concepts that are best understood
in conjunction; each of these practices can be either voluntary or mandatory.12 6
A good deal of confusion accompanies the use of the terms "pooling" and
"unitization" as they are often used interchangeably when discussing the
joining of interests into a unit.' 27 Although both pooling and unitization have
very similar legal effects, they are physically and operationally distinct.1 28
Generally speaking, pooling occurs when separately owned tracts of
land are "pooled" or joined together in order to comply with spacing
requirements or to have sufficient acreage with which to obtain a well
permit.1 2 9 In fact, most pooling law developed as a result of well spacing
requirements in state conservation statutes.13 0 As noted above, this has nothing
to do with the underlying geologic formations, but rather it focuses on the
spacing units, thus resulting in competition between units rather than
landowners.131
On the other hand, unitization is "the consolidation of mineral,
leasehold or royalty interests covering all or a portion of a common source of
supply."l 32 The goal of unitization is to consolidate enough of the interests in a
particular reservoir to allow production to be carried out in the most efficient
manner without the interference of competition and well-by-well regulations.1 3 3
This method of consolidation helps facilitate operations, such as
waterflooding,1 34 that lead to more effective production but are not easily
confined to spacing units. 135

Bruce M. Kramer, CompulsoryPoolingand Unitizationwith an Emphasis on the Statutory
and Common Law of the Eastern United States, 27 ENERGY & MIN. L. FOUND. 223, 224-25
126

(2007), http://www.emlf.org/clientuploads/directory/whitepaper/Kramer 07.pdf.
127
See Flanery & Morgan, supra note 42, at 477; Landy & Reese, supra note 85, at 11048.
128
4 NANcY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 54:1 (3d ed. 2009).
129
Kramer, supra note 126, at 225.
130
Id
131

SAINT-PAUL, supra note 128,

132

Kramer, supra note 126, at 224-25.

133

See SAINT-PAUL, supra note 128, § 54:1.

§ 54:1.

134
Waterflooding is "[a]n improved oil recovery technique that involves injecting water into
a producing reservoir to enhance movement of oil to producing wells." CONOCOPHILLIPS, supra
note 118.
135
KUNTz, supra note 111, § 78.1.
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Voluntary and Compulsory Pooling

Voluntary pooling may be accomplished by joining tracts into a single
lease or "voluntar[ily] consolidati[ng]" interests.136 Leases can create the right
to pool, authorizing the lessee to make a unit subject to size and purpose
restrictions.' 3 7 Most pooling is carried out under such provisions.' 3 8 Exercise of
this right is usually fairly simple as leases will normally provide that the filing
of a declaration of pooling, which outlines the acreage affected, is all that is
required.1 39 If a lessee pools in contravention of specific restrictions in the
lease, the action is invalid and may be remedied by the lessors' ratification of
the prohibited activity.1 4 0 Operators frequently utilize voluntary pooling
provisions to hold leased property.141 They accomplish this by establishing a
unit that will include portions of multiple leased tracts, thus holding all tracts in
the pool with the production of a single well.1 42
In contrast, mandatory pooling consists of the compulsory joining of
interests where applicable regulation will only allow one well.1 4 3 The common
goal of all statutory pooling provisions is to force owners to participate in the
drilling of the only allowable well on a unit.'" Statutory pooling is usually
accomplished by applying to the appropriate conservation agency for a pooling
order.1 4 5 Such an order is discretionary and will often only be issued to
"prevent waste or unnecessary drilling." 4 6 In addition, some states require that
the applicant show that "fair and reasonable offer[s] to pool voluntarily" were
made before resorting to forced statutory means.1 47 Resulting pooling orders
will provide non-operating parties with the option of whether to participateand bear the relevant costs of production-or not participate.1 4 8
There are a number of options for compensating parties who elect not
to participate.1 4 9 These include a cash payment, an overriding royalty in lieu of

SAINT-PAUL, supra note 128,

136

§ 54:1.

17 Id § 56:1.
138

RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS

139

Id. § 7.13(C).

140

SAINT-PAUL, supra note 128,

141
142

See HEMINGWAY, supra note 138,

143

SAINT-PAUL, supra note 128,

'"

See KUNTz, supra note 111, § 77.4(a).

145

Id. § 77.4(b).
id.

146

ed. 1983).

§ 56:1, 56:4.
§ 7.13(B).

See id.

148

Id. § 77.4(c).
Id. § 77.4(e).

149

See id. § 77.4(f).

147

§ 7.13 (2d

§

54:1.
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cash payment, or the option to be carried with or without a penalty." 0 The cash
payment is determined by the fair market value of the non-participating
interests.' 5 1 The possibility of an overriding royalty-if that option is offered
and accepted-is based on the transfer of the working interest to the operator,
and its value should also be determined based on the fair market value.1 5 2 The
third option, whereby the non-participating interest is carried, involves
allocating the risk of production to the pooling party. 5 3 When the drilling party
assumes the risk, conservation statutes differ on whether the party should
recover only the cost of production or some additional penalty "[t]o avoid
burdening the drilling party with all . . . expenses at the outset."l 5 4
Some scholars have been quick to point out the speculation problems
that are inherent in compulsory pooling statutes. 5 5 Such statutes often have a
positive effect by protecting owners of tracts that are too small to form a unit,
but that effect is limited by the regulation's focus on individual wells rather
than an entire common source. 56 The limit arises because non-participating
interests can take an overriding royalty in one well and transfer the risk to other
parties. 17 Even though they might pay a penalty before recovering in that
operation, the non-participating interests are now free to drill neighboring tracts
or units over the same reservoir with little to no risk. 58
b. Voluntary and Compulsory Unitization
Because pooling clauses are prevalent in oil and gas leases, agreements
for voluntary pooling are usually carried out with only the consent of working
interest owners.159 However, most voluntary unitization requires the consent of

ISO

See id. An overriding royalty is the "share of either production or revenue from production
(free of the costs of production) carved out of a lessee's interest under an oil-and-gas lease....
Overriding-royalty interests are often used to compensate those who have helped structure a
drilling venture. An overriding-royalty interest ends when the underlying lease terminates."
OverridingRoyalty, BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2005).
151
KUNTz, supra note 111, § 77.4(f).
152
Id. A working interest is defined as "[t]he rights to the mineral interest granted by an oiland-gas lease, so called because the lessee acquires the right to work on the leased property to
search, develop, and produce oil and gas, as well as the obligation to pay all costs." Working
Interest, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2005).
153
See KUNTZ,supra note 11, § 77.4(f).
154
SAINT-PAUL, supra note 128, § 55:2.
1
Anderson & Smith, supra note 109, at 281.
156
See id.
KaI
d.
158

159

Id.
Kramer, supra note 126, at 259-60.
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both working160 and royalty interests. 6 1 The process usually involves one

agreement between all interests to establish the unit and a separate operating
agreement between all working interests as to how production will be
accomplished. 162 Before such a project can be approved, a "substantial
amount[] of geological, geophysical, economic, financial, and other data must
be collected and digested."l 63 Such efforts are worthwhile because unitization
eliminates competition that stems from the rule of capture within a contiguous
oil and gas reservoir: it can save the working interests-and, therefore, the
royalty interests-more money the earlier a reservoir is unitized.'" Unitization
often results in a lower number of wells, a lack of duplicative infrastructure,
and the more efficient management of reservoir pressure. 6 1
Compulsory unitization statutes typically require the applicant to show
that some percentage of both working and royalty interest owners have agreed
to formation of the proposed unit.1 6 6 The applicant is normally responsible for
defining the boundaries of the proposed unit and might consider the following
factors: "the existence or non-existence of geophysical data, the ownership of
the tracts, the consent or lack thereof by the owners, the amount of unleased
acreage, the scale and uniformity of oil and gas development and differing
interpretations of the underlying geophysical data." 6 7 Problems can arise for
the conservation agency when interest owners dispute their inclusion or
exclusion from a proposed unit, citing incorrect consideration of the above
factors. 68 Another "contentious issue" surrounding compulsory unitization is
how profits from production will be shared, but the conservation agency
typically defers to the plan made by consenting interest owners if the plan is
"fair and reasonable." 69
iii. West Virginia ConservationLaw
West Virginia represents an interesting variety of the above regulatory
methods. It has been said, "West Virginia, by far, has the longest and most

160
161
162
163

For a definition of "working interest," see supra note 152.
Kramer, supra note 126, at 259-60.
See id. at 260.
1 BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION §

17.01, 17-2 (3d ed. 2004).
16

See id. at 17-7.

165

Id. at 17-7 to 8.
Kramer, supra note 126, at 260.
Id. at 263.
See id. at 263-64.
Id. at 265.

166
167

168
169
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complex series of oil and gas conservation statutes of all of the 50 states."' 70
West Virginia does not have any widely applicable well spacing or density
regulation other than the requirement that wells within a certain distance be
included for consideration with the application for a well permit.' 7 ' Rather, the
responsibility for overseeing the production of oil and gas is divided based on
the depth and mineral classification of the wells themselves.1 72 Each well
classification is subject to the authority of a different governing body and
statutory framework.1 73 This means that there is no voluntary pooling as it is
traditionally understood and developed-a method of complying with
applicable spacing and density requirements.1 74
The Secretary of the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP")
is given the authority to promulgate rules, enforce relevant statutes, and
"[p]erform all duties as the permit issuing authority for the state in all matters
pertaining to the exploration, development, production, storage and recovery of
th[e] state's oil and gas."
The Office of Oil and Gas within the DEP is
responsible for the permitting of coal bed methane ("CBM") wells in order to
balance the preservation of mineable coal with the recovery of CBM.1 76
The Shallow Gas Well Review Board ("Review Board") was formed in
an effort to ensure the cooperative and "fullest practical ... recovery" of the
state's coal and natural gas where they are produced from the same land.'" To
effectuate this goal, the Review Board has the limited authority to set spacing
requirements and establish drilling units when a coal owner or operator objects
to proposed shallow gas recovery efforts. 78
Lastly, the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission ("Commission") has
the authority to set spacing requirements for deep wells and is charged with

Kramer, supra note 126, at 237. For a comprehensive summary of the West Virginia
regulatory framework, see Sharon 0. Flanery & Ryan J. Morgan, A National Survey of Statutory
Pooling and Unitization, STEPTOE & JOHNSON (2011), http://www.steptoe-johnson.com/
sites/default/files/null/A_NationalSurvey-ofStatutoryPoolingand_Unitization.pdf.
171
Flanery & Morgan, supra note 170, at 740. See West Virginia Code § 22C-8-8(a) for
spacing requirements that become applicable only when a well permit is approved over objection
of an affected coal operator or owner.
172
Flanery & Morgan, supra note 42, at 496-97.
173
id
174
See text accompanying note 129.
170

"7

W. VA. CODE ANN.

176

Id. § 22-21-4.

§ 22-6-2 (West 2015).

Id. § 22C-8-1.
"' Id. §§ 22C-8-5 to -11. Note that this is the only method by which a shallow gas well can be
statutorily pooled; therefore, any well completed above the Onondaga Group-which is defined
generally as the group below the Marcellus Shale--can only be pooled if there is objection by a
coal owner. As of 2011, the Review Board had not exercised this authority. Flanery & Morgan,
supra note 170, at 719.
1'
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making rules that will prevent waste and protect correlative rights. 17 9 Deep
wells are defined as wells that are completed at or below the top of the
Onondaga Group. 80 In addition, the Commission has the authority to establish
drilling units and issue pooling orders for both conventional deep wells and
secondary recovery operations.' 8 ' The Commission has promulgated rules
requiring that deep wells be located at least 3,000 feet from another permitted
location and 400 feet from unit and lease boundaries. 18 2
In any of the above situations where pooling is a possibility, interest
owners are given the option to participate on either a working or carried interest
basis.1 83 However, there is very little consideration for minimum operator
control in the statutes. 184 Secondary recovery wells are the only wells for which
a minimum percentage of operators and royalty owners must consent to the
pooling of interests: 75% of each must consent.'8 5
Over the past several years, bills attempting to implement additional
unitization have been proposed and referred to committee.186 The proposed
legislation-a new section called § 22C-9-7a-would be the first compulsory
unitization statute in the state, but the proposal only seeks to permit mandatory
unitization of horizontally drilled wells in order to encourage their continuing
use for efficient and effective recovery. 18 7 The proposal requires an operator to
obtain the consent of 80% of executory interest royalty owners and 80% of the
operator interest before filing.188 It also provides that unleased interests in the
unit may sell their interest, lease to the operators, surrender their interest, or
participate on a limited or carried basis with a 200% penalty for their share of
the costs of production.1

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22C-9-4(f) (West 2015).
Id. § 22C-9-2(a)(12). The Onondaga Group is the geologic layer that lies beneath the
commonly known Marcellus Shale, which holds significant reserves of natural gas. See
MARCELLUS SHALE COALITION, THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE ONONDAGA 1-2 (2010),
http://marcelluscoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/msc-curious-case-of-onondaga.pdf.
18
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22C-9-7 to -8.
182
W. VA. CODE R. § 39-1-4.2 (2011).
183
Flanery & Morgan, supra note 170, at 744-45.
184
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22C-9-8.
185 Id.
179
18

187

See H.B. 2688, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015).
id.

188

id

189

id

186
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iv. Developments in West Virginia PartitionLaw
In West Virginia Code section 37-4-1, the West Virginia legislature
makes it possible for a cotenant to sue for partition of commonly held
property. 190 This practice has been utilized by oil and gas lessees to deal with
both consenting and non-consenting mineral interest owners.'91 The statute
states that "[t]enants in common, joint tenants and coparceners of real property,
including minerals, [and] lessees of mineral rights . .. shall be compelled to
make partition."l 9 2 However, "lessees of oil and gas minerals" are excepted
from those parties that may take advantage of the court's jurisdiction to
partition.1 93 The legislature also addresses instances in which partition in kind
cannot be made conveniently.' 9 4 It allows for one party to purchase another
party's interest, or it allows the court discretion to sell the entirety of the
property and divide the proceeds if such sale will benefit at least one party and
not prejudice the rest.1 95
96
the West Virginia
In Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. Riley,'
Supreme Court provided the clearest explanation of partition law as it relates to
oil and gas interests. In a syllabus point, the Court held as follows:
By virtue of W.Va. Code, 37-4-3, a party desiring to compel
partition through sale is required to demonstrate [1] that the
property cannot be conveniently partitioned in kind, [2] that the
interests of one or more of the parties will be promoted by the
sale, and [3] that the interests of the other parties will not be
prejudiced by the sale. 97
The plaintiff oil and gas company alleged that it was the owner of eleven98
twentieths of the oil and gas under three tracts of land.' Certain facts also
99
indicated that it was the lessee of all the oil and gas interest.1 The plaintiff

190

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-4-1 (West 2015).

See William M. Herlihy & Mark D. Clark, PartitionSuit Decision Could Be Problematic
Va. Oil and Gas Operators, SPILMAN THOMAS & BATTLE (Sep. 26, 2014),
http://www.spilmanlaw.com/resources/attorney-authored-articles/environmental/partition-suitdecision-could-be-problematic-for.
192
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-4-1.
'

for W.

193

Id.

Id. § 37-4-3. Partition in kind is the physical division of the property at issue; this is
distinguished from partition by sale where the piece of property is sold, either by consent of all
cotenants or by court order, and the proceeds divided up according to the cotenants' interests.
194

195

Id.

196

247 S.E.2d 712 (W. Va. 1978).

'9

Id. at syl. pt. 3.

198

Id. at 713.

19

Id.
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sought partition by sale because it argued that the interests could not be
partitioned in kind. 20 0 However, the defendants contended that the interests
could, in fact, be partitioned in kind and "that their interests would be
materially prejudiced by a sale." 201 The court reasoned that the promotion or
prejudice of the parties' interests is a factual issue to be determined by the
court. 202

Despite the plaintiff's arguments to the contrary, the court concluded
that the language of West Virginia Code section 37-4-1 was meant to ensure
the right to have partition in kind of oil and gas interests considered.2 03 The
court also rejected previous case law where partition was "not available where
there [was] a subsisting lease," and held that partition may be compelled but
will be subject to existing leases.204 The court reversed the summary judgment
granted to the plaintiff by the trial court and remanded the case for
consideration of factual issues related to feasibility of partition in kind and the
prejudice or promotion of interests attendant to a partition by sale.205
Justice Neely dissented, raising concerns that the majority should have
directed summary judgment in favor of the defendants.206 His concerns
stemmed from the fact that the plaintiff was the eleven-twentieths owner and
also the lessee of all removal rights.207 Because of this, the plaintiff would most
likely have been the only party interested in purchasing the property at sale and
could then have profited from any advance in extraction techniques.2 08
According to Justice Neely, the defendants were doing no harm to the plaintiff
other than enjoying ownership of their property and possibly reaping the
benefits of the leases they had executed with the plaintiff.209 To allow the
plaintiff partition by sale would only unjustly enrich them because they may
hold out on profitable extraction until the parties agree to a sale or a sale is
forced.2 10

200
201
202
203
204
205

206

Id. at 713.
Id.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 716.
Id. at 717.
Id. at 716.
Id. at 718 (Neely, J., dissenting).

207

id.

208

Id. at 719

209

Id.
id

210
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III. ANALYSIS

Currently, West Virginia does not have an appropriate means of
statutory pooling in relation to Marcellus Shale development.21 1 Most of the
statutes are concerned with the resolution of conflicts between coal owners and
those who would seek to develop the shallow gas or CBM. 2 12 There is a gaping
hole in state regulation as it relates to establishing reservoir wide units for
shallow wells, and this shortcoming affects the basic "policy goals of
correlative rights protection and waste prevention."2 13 In order to overcome
these deficiencies for the purpose of horizontal well development, other sources
have made suggestions relating to the spacing, notice and approval, costs and
election, and surface use requirements for Appalachian pooling statutes. 2 14
Beyond these proposals, however, in order to ensure that correlative rights and
conservation goals are satisfied in the continued development of the Marcellus
Shale, West Virginia should adopt a statutory pooling and unitization scheme
for shallow oil and gas wells.
The debate about compulsory pooling and unitization has been
circulating in this country for years, and many oil and gas producing states have
adopted statutes that impose some permutation of them. 215 As mentioned
above, the topic has been thoroughly discussed bz other sources, both
regionally and in West Virginia's neighboring states.2 1 In contribution to that
discussion, this Note analyzes specific West Virginia common law and
statistics in order to determine how the state and its citizens might benefit from
a compulsory pooling or unitization statute.
Part III.A below discusses several examples from West Virginia case
law that demonstrate why compulsory pooling and unitization are consistent
with West Virginia case law and how they promote the rights that West
Virginia's legislature and Court value. Part III.B then examines how
compulsory pooling or unitization can act as an appealing alternative to unjust
and inequitable present practices such as partition suits, which may give oil and
gas companies the upper hand-a charge frequently leveled against compulsory
statutes as well. Lastly, Part III.C uses land ownership data to analyze how such
a statute might have a positive affect by helping private landowners in addition
to large corporate owners, and it outlines certain important provisions that
should be included in such a statute.

211

Flanery & Morgan, supra note 42, at 505.

212

id

213

id.

See id. at 505-11. See generally Landy & Reese, supra note 85 (proposing that
Pennsylvania adopt a statutory pooling scheme).
215
Flanery & Morgan, supra note 42, at 468.
216
See, e.g., Landy & Reese, supra note 85.
214
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West VirginiaShould Limit the Rule of Capturewith Legislation
Because PresentLaw Does Not Adequately Address Landowner
Concerns

West Virginia should further limit the rule of capture and focus on
correlative rights with its legislation. In 1994, the West Virginia legislature
found that oil and gas had been continuously produced in the state for over a
century and that the best way to continue to encourage the production of oil and
natural gas from shallow formations was not to impose regulation on the
pooling and unitization of such wells except in specific circumstances. 2 17 This
policy may be designed to encourage shallow well exploration and production
through limited regulation in much the same way as the rule of capture is often
meant to encourage operations by limiting liability. 218 However, since that time,
exploiting the shallow formation of the Marcellus Shale has been made much
more viable by the advent of economic horizontal drilling along with hydraulic
fracturing. 219 The time has come for the legislature to reconsider the law
concerning pooling and unitization of shallow oil and gas wells in light of
developments in technology, case law, and land ownership.
The rule of capture has become, in the words of the seminal
Pennsylvania case De Witt, "too fanciful," and it is in need of further limitation
by legislative action.2 2 0 The pure rule of capture encourages every landowner
and operator to drill on his or her land to avoid losing valuable resources to
neighboring operations. 2 2 1 Left unchecked, this leads to waste of resources by
premature reservoir pressure depletion due to overproduction.22 2 In addition,
the overproduction means that a disproportionate amount of the surface is
unnecessarily used where fewer wells would have been sufficient.2 23 Such a
waste of both surface and mineral resources is detrimental to the wealth of
individual landowners and the economy of the state.224 Because of the
proliferation of shallow gas wells resulting from hydraulic fracturing, the

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22C-9-1 (West 2015).
See LOWE, supra note 15, at 13.
219 See Jason A. Proctor, Note, The Legality of DrillingSideways: HorizontalDrillingand Its
Future in West Virginia, 115 W. VA. L. REv. 491, 494-95 (2012).
220
Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889).
221
Flanery & Morgan, supranote 42, at 460.
217

218

222

id.

See Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721, 725-26 (W. Va. 1980) (outlining the
"reasonable and necessary" right for operators to use the surface).
224
For a discussion of the effects of the rule of capture and pooling/unitization from the
perspective of a surface owner, see Well Spacing and Royalty Sharing, W. VA. SURFACE
OWNERS' RIGrTS ORG., http://www.wvsoro.org/resources/poolingunitization/index.html (last
visited Oct. 8, 2015).
223
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legislature should consider ways to further hamper the unjust effects of the pure
rule of capture.
The case law has left unsatisfactory holes in its correlative rights
decisions that attempt to limit the rule, and while bills have been proposed and
referred to committee,225 both houses of the legislature have yet to pass a
statutory scheme for compulsory pooling or unitization. While they have
significantly limited the scope of the rule, cases concerning the rule of capture,
waste, and implied duties leave concerns for landowners that would best be
addressed by the legislature. The following subsections consider these
shortcomings in more detail. Subsection 1 analyzes how mandatory pooling
would be a superior solution to voluntary pooling in terms of limiting the rule
of capture. Subsections 2 and 3 show that waste prevention decisions and the
implied duties of oil and gas lessees are insufficient to protect landowners.
1.

Voluntary Pooling Is an Insufficient Solution as Compared to
Compulsory Pooling

A compulsory pooling statute would eliminate many of the problems
that have been associated with West Virginia's current voluntary statute. In the
West Virginia rule-of-capture cases BoggeSS 226 and Powers,2 27 the court was
limited in its authority to assist unleased fractional interests because the
legislature allows for voluntary pooling of an adjacent tract where only a part
of the interest in that adjacent tract has been leased.228 In similar situations
where a partially leased tract sits next to a wholly leased tract, the oil and gas
companies hold an unacceptable amount of power over the unleased interest
owners during negotiations. This is because they have better knowledge of both
where they intend to drill and what interests they need to acquire in order to do
so.
Therefore, unleased landowners lose a substantial amount of
bargaining power if an operator decides to drill on a wholly leased tract after
only partially leasing the unleased owner's adjacent tract. The unleased partial
interest is faced with two equally unappealing alternatives. First, if the unleased
party holds out for better terms or decides not to lease at all, that party keeps
the operator from drilling on the tract that is partially leased.2 2 9 However, the
operator may not need to drill on the unleased party's land in order to make
economic recovery. Because no one will want to lease a partially pooled tract,
the operator may successfully keep other interested parties from leasing the

225
226
227

228
229

H.B. 2688, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015).
Boggess v. Milam, 34 S.E.2d 267 (W. Va. 1945).
Powers v. Union Drilling, Inc., 461 S.E.2d 844 (W. Va. 1995).
Id. at 849.
Gain v. S. Penn Oil Co., 86 S.E. 883, 884 (W. Va. 1915).
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land simply by pooling the leased interest of the partially leased tract. On the
other hand, if an unleased partial interest owner decides to lease for fear that an
opportunity may pass or the operator will drain him from adjacent lands, he
may agree to terms that are less favorable than the actual value of his interest
and what he could have bargained for.
In either of the above scenarios, the oil and gas company has all the
requisite information, and the private landowner is left to guess and gamble
about what he should do. In order to protect private landowners, the state
should enact a compulsory pooling statute that requires the leasing or pooling
of every interest in a tract that an oil and gas company intends to include in a
unit. In addition, the application process should require a showing that all the
executory interests were offered a fair and reasonable lease agreement.230
These requirements would give landowners the bargaining power to
ask for better terms because even if negotiations fail with an interested
operator, the landowners will be able to fall back on statutory minimums if a
fractional interest in their tract has already been leased. A compulsory pooling
statute gives an advantage to landowners because in order to drill on one tract
that it intends to use to drain neighboring properties, an oil and gas company is
faced with a choice. It must choose between pooling neighboring properties to
avoid violating the implied duty to protect against drainage-and thus having
to pool all interests-or surrendering its leases on adjacent lands. The latter
option is unwise because it risks exploitation by another operator once the field
is proven to provide economic recovery.
At the same time, by forcing certain unleased parties to participate, a
compulsory pooling provision would protect lessors from having to surrender
partially leased tracts as suggested above. In order to keep lessees from abusing
this method of pooling, it is important to ensure that the statute requires a high
percentage of consenting executory interests. In addition, requiring a showing
of reasonable efforts to lease the unleased interests would keep lessees from
simply compelling the participation of unleased interests above the minimum
threshold.
Critics of statutory pooling argue that a compulsory pooling statute like
the one suggested above does nothing more than exacerbate the inherent
problems of a system based in the rule of capture. 23 1 They argue that while
compulsory pooling does prevent waste and help protect correlative rights, 2 32 it
does so by ignoring "the true nature of the typical oil and gas reservoir," which
is nonhomogeneous and drains inconsistently. 233 According to those critics, it
230
See KuNTz, supra note 111, § 77.4(c). A fair and reasonable offer to lease might be proven
by evidence that similar offers are commonplace-that they are made and accepted regularly
either throughout the industry or the geographic area. See id.
231
See Pierce,supra note 84, at 765.
232
id
233
Anderson & Smith, supra note 109, at 281.
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follows that the problems inherent in the rule of capture-overproduction and
waste-are simply promoted to a larger scale by a system that focuses on
competition between spaced or pooled units rather than competition on a wellby-well basis.2 34 This analysis leads many scholars to favor unitization over
pooling. 235 Unitization is a reservoir-wide process that requires substantial data
collection and planning in order to be successful.2 36 Unitization has its benefits,
as explained in the next section, but compulsory pooling would effectively help
eliminate some of the correlative rights concerns of individual landowners as
discussed above.
2. The West Virginia Court's Decisions Focused on Waste Protect the
State in General but Do Not Adequately Protect Private
Landowners
Developing a system of compulsory unitization would supplement and
greatly enhance the court's concern for limiting the waste of oil and gas
resources. Atkinson v. Virginia Oil and Gas Co. 237 provides a good example of
how case law meant to prevent waste and encourage correlative rights falls
short without the proper legislation. In Atkinson, the court allowed for a
landowner to recover damages when the defendant drilled a well on adjacent
property a mere 100 feet from the boundary line and abandoned the well
without plugging it. 2 38 This caused injury to the plaintiff because water seeping
into the well obstructed his production from the common reservoir. 2 39 The court
allowed for recovery of damages because of the defendant's negligent
maintenance of a condition that affected the plaintiffs recovery.24 0 Consider,
on the other hand, that the pure rule of capture would not have stopped the
defendant from draining every last drop of oil and gas from beneath the
plaintiffs land if it had continued its operation rather than abandoning the
well. 241 By attempting to provide for the enjoyment of the plaintiffs land
without negligent interference, the court creates a puzzling contradiction.
In other cases, the court unfailingly holds to the rule of capture; it does
not matter to the court who recovers oil and gas as long as it is not wasted.2 42

234
231

236

See id.
Id. at 284.
KRAMER & MARTIN,

supra note 163, at 17-2.
Atkinson v. Va. Oil & Gas Co., 79 S.E. 647 (W. Va. 1913); see supra text accompanying
notes 93-99.
238
Id. at 647-48.
239
Id. at 648.
237

240

id.

241

See Hardwicke, supra note 25, at 393.
See Powers v. Union Drilling, Inc., 461 S.E.2d 844, 849 (W. Va. 1995).

242
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At first, providing each party with a fair chance to recover seems like the best
way to prevent waste, but prohibitions against negligence and waste only apply
to instances such as Atkinson where waste or injury to other parties is not
beneficial individually or economically. Therefore, policing negligence is
helpful for ensuring that each party gets a chance to recover its fair share, but
such enforcement does little to stem the effects of overproduction and
premature depletion when the rule of capture is allowed to rule the competition
to drill.
While the correlative rights decisions such as Atkinson do prevent
waste and allow a fair chance, they are not an effective way to ensure that
private landowners can recover the value of their minerals if competitive
drilling resulting from the rule of capture leads to overproduction. By requiring
operators to define a workable field and unitize it accordingly, the legislature
could more effectively ensure that the Department of Energy supervises the
efficient and economic recovery from entire pools of minerals. More efficient
and economic recovery provides each interest owner with as much of a
recovered interest-monetary profit-as possible.
3.

Implied Duties of an Oil and Gas Lease Protect Landowners but
Also Encourage Overproduction from Commonly Owned
Reservoirs

By requiring the pooling of commonly leased interests, the legislature
could combat the overproduction that is encouraged by the implied duties to
develop under an oil and gas lease. Adkins v. Huntington Development & Gas
Co.2 43 provides a good example of how the case law falls short when it applies
the implied duties of an oil and gas lease. In Adkins, the court forced the
defendant to drill an offset well-even though it was not clear that a reasonably
prudent operator would have done so-because the defendant was draining the
plaintiff lessor's land from adjacent tracts. 24 Such a situation would be
unlikely to arise today due to the prevalence of voluntary pooling clauses in oil
and gas leases, 245 but the case does demonstrate the limited benefits that courtimposed duties can provide.
For each individual lessor, such as the one in Adkins, the implied duties
to develop and protect against drainage are beneficial and force operators to act
24
for the benefit of the lessor.246 In addition, these duties ensure that an operator
who holds leases over much of a reservoir is fair and balanced in its

243
244
245
246

168 S.E. 366 (W. Va. 1932).
Id. at 369.
SAINT-PAUL, supra note 128, § 56:1; HEMINGWAY, supra note 138,
See Jennings v. S. Carbon Co., 80 S.E. 368, 369 (W. Va. 1913).
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maintenance of operations and payments of royalties to all lessors.2 47 However,
in reservoirs where more than one lessee owns the right to develop different
tracts or portions, the duties may lead to competition between lessors and have
the additional effect of encouraging overproduction where such overproduction
still produces economic, while not optimal, results.
Therefore, in certain circumstances, the implied duties to develop,
which seek to protect lessors and ensure that they have a chance to recover the
value of their interest, serve only to exacerbate the problems inherent with the
rule of capture by effecting overproduction. In order to limit such effects, the
legislature could require that commonly leased adjacent properties be pooled.
This would eliminate concerns about fraudulent drainage from adjacent
properties, and it would lead to more efficient production. However, the better
option would be to require that separate lessees over a reservoir develop the
reservoir under joint operating agreements. Requiring unitization would
eliminate the undesirable competition among different lessees 248 and ensure
that each landowner receives the maximum amount of value from their share in
the commonly owned reservoir.249
As demonstrated above, the current case law cannot adequately protect
landowners from the practices available to oil and gas operators and lessees. In
order to alleviate these negative effects on landowners-and provide benefit to
the state through more efficient production-it would be wise for West
Virginia to consider the benefits of a compulsory pooling statute. The
legislature should also weigh the benefits of switching from a regulatory
scheme focused well-by-well on the rule of capture to one focused on defining
reservoirs for unitization.250 In large part, the state court's correlative rights
decisions have already limited the rule of capture, but the focus on limitation
through legislative action needs to be more pronounced in order to satisfy the
needs of mineral interest owners, surface owners, the state, and operators. 2 5 1
Therefore, the legislature should use a system of statutory pooling or
unitization to better protect the correlative rights of its citizens.
B. A Compulsory Statute Would Provide Alternativesfor Non-Consenting
Interests
Compulsory pooling or unitization would satisfy correlative rights
concerns because they allow consenting mineral interest owners to produce
their minerals and provide the most workable solution for non-consenting

247
248

249

Adkins, 168 S.E. at 369.
Anderson & Smith, supranote 109, at 281.
See SAINT-PAUL, supra note 128, § 54:1; see also KRAMER &

MARTIN,

supra note 163, at

17-7.
250

251

See Pierce, supra note 84, at 775.
See id. at 779.
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executory interests. 25 2 Most obviously, a system of compulsory pooling or
unitization would be beneficial to consenting mineral interest owners-and
therefore operators-because it allows them to recover the monetary value of
their interest, which they have a right to do. At the same time, compulsory
pooling can also protect the interest of non-consenting interest owners who are
negotiating for better lease terms as discussed in Section A.253
However, because of certain provisions, such compulsory legislation
often comes under attack as an unconstitutional taking or an unfair way to deal
with non-consenting owners.254 While these concerns have been raised in other
states, the constitutional validity of a well-written statute "is beyond dispute" as
such mechanisms have been in use across the country for many years. 255 This
section addresses the reality that although there is understandable resistance to
forcing executory interests to produce their minerals, enactment of a statutory
scheme for pooling or unitization in shallow wells is the only readily available
alternative to current undesirable methods of dealing with non-consenting
executor interests.
While it is well settled that the state has the authority to force pool or
unitize interests,256 in the absence of such legislation, the legislative and
judicial branches in West Virginia have put forth woefully inconsistent views
on the permissibility of forcing non-consenting interest owners to either lease,
sell, or develop their interest. On the one hand, the court has held that
executory interests cannot be forced to convert their interest in real property
into a monetary interest.257 Cotenants cannot perpetrate waste by drilling
without the consent of the others, even if the non-consenting interest is very
small and would be paid the full value of their oil and gas in place rather than a
royalty.258 On the other hand, the legislature has allowed for the partition by
sale of real property interests, when requested by cotenants who would benefit
from the partition, as long as it will not prejudice any of the other cotenants. 259
Combined with the legislature's refusal to enact statutory schemes for pooling
or unitization, the partition statute has led oil and gas companies and interest
owners to file suit for partition by sale of mineral interests. 26 0 Whether used as
a threat or actually effectuated, these suits serve to force a mineral interest
owner to part with his interest in real property in exchange for economic

252

See supra text accompanying notes 150-54.

253

See supra Part III.A.

254

For an example of this attitude, see Well Spacing and Royalty Sharing, supra note 224.
Flanery & Morgan, supra note 42, at 472.

255
256

Id.

257

S. Penn Oil Co. v. Haught, 78 S.E. 759, 762 (W. Va. 1913).

258

Id.

259

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-4-3 (West 2015).
See Herlihy & Clark, supra note 191.

260
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benefit, a method of dealing with non-consenting interests that was decried by
the court almost a century ago.26
Although a statutory scheme for compulsory pooling or unitization
would also force executory interests to accept some benefit in exchange for
their interest in real property,262 such a scheme is preferable to the current
option of partition. When a party seeks partition by sale of a partially leased
tract, there is no incentive for any party to purchase the partitioned interest at a
judicial sale unless they might profit in excess of what they spent on it. 2 63
While it is possible that speculators could purchase the interest with plans to
consent to its development, it seems more likely that the interest will be
purchased by the oil and gas company who wants to drill over the protests of a
non-consenting interest-owner. The latter case raises the concerns voiced by
Justice Neely in ConsolidatedGas Supply Corp. v. Riley.264 In that case, an oil
and gas company was eleven-twentieths owner of the mineral interests on a
particular tract as well as the lessee of all the mineral interest and sought to
partition the interest by sale because it could not be conveniently partitioned in
kind.2 65 The court remanded the case for consideration of the feasibility of
partition in kind and whether interests would be prejudiced or promoted in a
partition by sale.266 On the other hand, Justice Neely argued that this gave too
much power to oil and gas companies who held ownership interests in mineral
tracts.26 7
Justice Neely's concerns certainly seem well founded when the
plaintiff cotenant is also the lessee of the entire tract.268 However, even when a
non-lessee cotenant brings a partition suit against a non-consenting interest, the
non-consenting interest owner is denied the possibility that the royalty or value
of the oil and gas in place under his land will exceed what he paid for the
interest or what he might receive for it at a judicial sale. 2 69 Because partition is
currently the only option for overcoming a non-consenting interest that will not
accept reasonable offers to lease,270 the threat of such suit leads to an unjust
compulsion for landowners to lease or sell their property for fear of being
forced to litigate their interest. Compulsory pooling or unitization would be an

S. Penn Oil Co., 78 S.E. at 762.
SAINT-PAUL, supra note 128, § 54:11.
263
See Consol. Gas Supply Corp. v. Riley, 247 S.E.2d 712, 719 (W. Va.
1978) (Neely, J.,
dissenting).
264
Id. at 718-19.
265
Id. at 713 (majority opinion).
261

262

266
267

268
269
270

Id. at 716.
Id. at 719 (Neely, J., dissenting).
Id. at 718.
See id. at 719.
See Herlihy & Clark, supra note 191.
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equitable way to encourage production, thus providing jobs and contributing to
the state's economy, by affording a final option for operators who run up
against small factions of non-consenting interests. Although it provides lessees
27
with an avenue for overcoming the desire of a private landowner, ' such a
statutory scheme would properly balance the interests of landowners by
affording them better options than they currently face with the prevalence of
partition suits.272

Compulsory pooling or unitization is an imperfect solution because, in
a way, it forces the non-consenting owners to convert their interest in real
2 73
However, it provides a non-consenting
property into a monetary interest.

interest with a larger variety of options than the threat of partition suit currently
does.274 If the traditional model is followed, a compulsory pooling and
unitization statute would allow non-consenting interests to sell their interest,
receive an overriding royalty, or participate as a carried working interest with a
penalty.275
There are plenty of good reasons for a landowner to decide that they do
not want to lease their land, whether it be to negotiate a better lease or because
of environmental concerns. A statute that requires a considerable portion of
landowners to consent to the lease and production of their interest before the
application can be made to force pool non-consenting interests would provide
those non-consenting landowners the opportunity to profit from the production
of their mineral interest even if they did not consent at first or if they were
holding out for better lease terms from the operator. In addition, it would lean
the balance of negotiating power more in the favor of small landowners,
allowing them to decide whether to sell or risk participation. Therefore, a
statutory scheme for pooling or unitization would promote correlative rights by
providing more options and opportunities for non-consenting interests.
C. EnsuringBenefit to West Virginians
When a state legislature considers proposed legislation and regulation,
its chief concern should be how the laws will benefit the citizens of its state. It
is important to provide a legislative climate that is attractive to businesses and
corporate actors who will bring economic and employment benefits to the
citizens of West Virginia. One can imagine that these statewide benefits might
sometimes take a priority position over laws that focus on individuals.
However, that has not been the focus of this Note. For the most part, this Note

271

272
273
274
275

KuNTz, supra note 111, § 77.4(e).
See supra text accompanying notes 149-54.
See S. Penn Oil Co. v. Haught, 78 S.E. 759, 762 (W. Va. 1913).
See KuwTz, supra note 111, § 77.4(f).
See id.
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argues that present case law, statutes, and regulations are insufficient to
adequately protect the rights of mineral interest owners.276 It also attempts to
demonstrate how a statutory scheme for pooling or unitization has the potential
to better protect those interests.277 The following subsections will discuss more
specifically how such laws can benefit private landowners-as opposed to
corporate landowners-and how the presently proposed legislation should be
altered.
1.

Land Ownership Statistics Provide Evidence of a Potential Benefit

Forty or 50 years ago, if advanced drilling technology existed, a
statutory scheme for compulsory pooling or unitization might only have
benefited large out-of-state corporations.27 8 In 1974, a study found that only 24
out-of-state private companies owned roughly a third of the state's privately
held land; in addition, it found that out-of-state companies owned at least half
the land in almost half the state's counties. 2 79 Another research effort in 1978,
which sampled 15 counties, found that "[l]arge corporations owned 40 percent
of the land and 70 percent of the minerals." 28 0 However, big energy companies
do not own nearly as much property as they used to; large timber companies
have replaced them as the top owners, and now the top 25 private landowners
hold interest in only 17.6% of the state's land.2 8' In eight of the top ten oil and
gas producing counties, the top ten private landowners own less than 25% of
the privately held land.282 For instance, Harrison County produces more than a
fifth of the state's natural gas, but the top ten landowners in Harrison County
own only 7.2% of the surface acreage. 283
Due to the unavailability or inadequacy of tax data, the 2013 study
cited above did not examine ownership of minerals interests.2 84 Therefore, it is
difficult to postulate about the percentage of mineral interests that are owned by
individuals rather than corporations. A more detailed study concerning those
interests would be beneficial in determining the extent to which a statutory
pooling or unitization scheme would provide benefit to companies and out-of-

276

See supra Part III.A-B.
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See BETH SPENCE ET AL., W. VA. CENTER ON BUDGET & POLIcY,
WHO OwNs WEST

VIRGINIA? (Dec. 2013), http://www.wvpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/land-study-paper-
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id. at 8.
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state owners in comparison to in-state individuals who are non-consenting or
need to be protected from the effects of the rule of capture.
However, if ownership of mineral interests parallels ownership of
surface acreage at all, then the ownership of mineral interests is far less
concentrated than it used to be, and it is especially low in some of the most
productive oil and gas counties. Regardless of whether mineral interests are
more prevalently owned by individuals than corporations, a compulsory
pooling or unitization statute would help ensure efficient production and protect
unleased interests in addition to providing more options for non-consenting
interest owners than the current practice of partition by sale.
2.

Current Proposal and Recommendations

The primary focus of a statutory scheme for pooling and unitization of
shallow wells should be to protect the interests of West Virginians in addition
to promoting production that will benefit the state's economy and tax income.
To that end, any statute purporting to authorize the forced pooling or
unitization of parties that have elected not to participate should require the
consent of a relatively high number of executory interest owners as well as
operator interests. Doing so would ensure that most interest owners are given a
fair opportunity to negotiate lease terms with prospective lessees.
At present, the only pooling statute to provide for minimum operator
and interest owner consent in West Virginia is the statute relating to secondary
recovery operations; it requires that 75% of operators and 75% of interest
owners consent to formation of the pool before an order will be issued. 2 85 The
current legislative proposal, which attempts to implement unitization for
horizontal wells rather than shallow wells in general, requires 80% of executory
interest owners and 80% of operators to consent.2 8 However, previously
introduced bills required as much as 85% of operators consent to unitization.2 8 7
In an effort to protect the free negotiation of lease terms, the requirement for
both consenting interest owners and operators in the statutory proposal should
be raised to 85%.288
IV. CONCLUSION

West Virginia's conservation law is plenteous and complex.289
Considering the recent boom in Marcellus Shale production resulting from
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22C-9-8 (West 2015).
H.B. 2688, 82nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015).
287
S.B. 578, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014) (referred to the Committee on Energy,
Industry and Mining).
285

286

288

Id.

289

Kramer, supra note 126, at 237.
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horizontal drilling techniques,2 90 it is surprising that the legislature has
neglected to enact a statutory mechanism for pooling or unitization. Such a
statute would encourage the efficient and economic recovery of the state's
resources while better protecting the rights of both executory interest owners
and operators. 2 9 1 The time has come for the West Virginia legislature to
consider a statutory scheme for compulsory pooling and unitization that would
encompass horizontal drilling of shallow wells in the Marcellus Shale made
possible by advances in technology.
Consider how a compulsory pooling or unitization statute would
change the example from There Will Be Blood discussed at the beginning of
this Note.2 92 In that film, a landowner did not want to lease his mineral rights,
but because of the rule of capture, the operator had permissibly drained the
landowner of all his oil. 2 93 If the operator had been under the constraints of
statutory pooling or unitization, the landowner-a non-consenting interest
owner-might have been forced to include his land in a proposed pool or
unit.294 Although this participation would have been forced, the landowner
would have received the value of his interest rather than having it drained
without his consent.295
Because of similar situations taking place in West Virginia-as well as
less dramatic ones-the legislature must act to ensure that the state's law
remains current with available resource removal technology.296 Such legislation
would limit the negative effects of the rule of capture that have not sufficiently
been negated by the common law. 2 97 In addition, it would provide an increased
set of options and a regulatory framework for non-consenting executory
interests that are presently threatened by partition suits. 2 9 8 If recent studies are
reliable, a trend in private ownership of West Virginia's land would mean that
such legislation has the potential to positively affect more in-state landowners
than it would have in the recent past.299 In any event, if the legislature focuses
on the consent of and options available to the executory interests, the statute
would provide an avenue for efficient and economic recovery of minerals while
safeguarding the interests of private landowners. Therefore, in order to ensure
that correlative rights and conservation goals are satisfied in the continued
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See supra Part III.

supra note 10, at 1.
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development of the Marcellus Shale, West Virginia should adopt a statutory
pooling or unitization scheme for shallow oil and gas wells.
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